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Abstract
Neuromarketing has recently generated controversies concerning the involvement of medical
professionals, and many key questions remain—ones that have potentially important implications
for the field of psychiatry. Conflicting definitions of neuromarketing have been proposed, and
little is known about the actual practices of companies, physicians, and scientists involved in its
practice. This article reviews the history of neuromarketing and uses an exploratory survey of
neuromarketing Web sites to illustrate ethical issues raised by this new field. Neuromarketing, as
currently practiced, is heterogeneous, as companies are offering a variety of technologies. Many
companies employ academicians and professionals, but few list their clients or fees. Media
coverage of neuromarketing appears disproportionately high compared to the paucity of peer-
reviewed reports in the field. Companies may be making premature claims about the power of
neuroscience to predict consumer behavior. Overall, neuromarketing has important implications
for academic-industrial partnerships, the responsible conduct of research, and the public
understanding of the brain. We explore these themes to uncover issues relevant to professional
ethics, research, and policy. Of particular relevance to psychiatry, neuromarketing may be seen as
an extension of the search for quantification and certainty in previously indefinite aspects of
human behavior.
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Psychiatry is increasingly embracing functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) and
other neurotechnologies, which carry the promise of revealing the underpinnings of
emotions and social interactions. Similarly, various domains have acquired the prefix neuro-
as brain science increasingly informs our daily lives, social practices, and intellectual
discourses. This collection of new fields—for example, neuroaesthetics, neurotheology, and
neuroeducation—has been labeled neuroculture, and the brain-based explanations arising
from it are progressively influencing public notions of personal identity, responsibility, and
causation.1 Neuromarketing, which can be tentatively defined as marketing designed on the
basis of neuroscience research, is one manifestation of this new neuroculture. The field
offers insights into the development of brain-based narratives and into the potential
problems that they might pose for medical ethics and the public understanding of science.
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Neuromarketing has attracted increasing attention, but critical aspects of it remain
underexplored, including what exactly it is or includes, and how it is used in practice. The
field has already generated controversy. For example, the popular press has reported on the
perceived dangers of neuromarketing, including concerns that advertisers might find a “buy
button” or “magic spot” in the brain;2,3 editorials in the scientific literature have argued that
these worries are most likely premature since the current state of imaging technology does
not allow for accurate, deterministic predictions of human decision making;4,5 and still
others have expressed concerns that neuromarketing might one day threaten individual
autonomy if this technology were able to effectively manipulate consumer behavior.6
Indeed, the authors of one recent review are optimistic about the potential of this
technology, asserting that neuromarketing will “soon be able to reveal hidden information
about consumer preferences”—though they recognize that this technology is unlikely to be
more cost-effective than traditional marketing.7
Universities and medical professionals have been criticized for forming partnerships with
neuromarketing companies.8 For example, consumer groups claimed that Emory University
violated the Belmont Report's principle of beneficence when it partnered with a
neuromarketing company; the groups asserted that this research promotes “socially harmful”
results such as increasing sales of unhealthy food or facilitating political propaganda.8
Yet, surprisingly, there have been few descriptions of neuromarketing as it currently exists,
and many key aspects of such companies are unknown: to what extent these technologies are
actually being used in the private sector; whether and how they are associated with
academicians; and what claims are being made. Indeed, there is little consensus over what
should be considered neuromarketing at all.
This new development in neuroscience has important implications for the public
understanding of science. Some have argued that the public understanding of brain imaging
lacks sufficient skepticism.9 The public may not always realize that the colorful results in a
functional brain scan appear as such only after extensive image processing and statistical
analyses, and in the context of a specific experimental paradigm.10 Indeed, members of the
public find descriptions of neuroscience findings more persuasive when descriptions of
research are accompanied by brain images—even though these images have no actual
impact on the objective validity of those findings.11
WHAT IS NEUROMARKETING?
The earliest reported use of the word neuromarketing appears to be in a June 2002 press
release by an Atlanta advertising firm, BrightHouse, announcing the creation of a business
division using fMRI for marketing research.12 This firm quickly attracted criticism for
potential conflicts of interest involving Emory University; the new business division of
BrightHouse was established by Emory faculty, including at least one professor in
psychiatry, and the imaging studies used Emory's facilities.8 The anti-advertising civic
group Commercial Alert advanced some of the most vocal criticisms of this work—for
example, the spread of “marketing-related diseases” resulting from the promotion of junk
food companies—and they soon asked the federal Office for Human Research Protections
and the U.S. Senate to investigate BrightHouse's research.13 The Web site for BrightHouse
Neurostrategies, as it was called, was quickly taken down, and the new enterprise faded
from public attention.
Long before this type of work acquired its neuro-prefix, however, and long before Emory
University and BrightHouse announced their partnership, corporations have sponsored
neurophysiologic research into marketing topics—for example, by studying consumer
reactions to television programming with electroencephalography (EEG).14,15 Of note, four
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years before the term neuromarketing was coined, Professors Gerald Zaltman and Stephen
Kosslyn of Harvard University16 filed a patent for “Neuroimaging as a marketing tool”;
however, Zaltman quickly shifted his focus to the “Zaltman Metaphor Elicitation
Technique,” a structured interview that does not employ imaging technology, and Kosslyn
appears not to have been involved in neuromarketing until 2008, when he joined the
advisory board of a company called NeuroFocus.17,18
More recently, researchers have proposed conflicting definitions of neuromarketing,
preferring to see it as essentially a scientific field rather than as a business. Specifically, Lee
and colleagues19 have defined neuromarketing as academic scholarship: “a valid field of
study” and not simply “the application of neuroimaging techniques to sell products.” Some
companies that describe their activities as neuromarketing have not published their results in
peer-reviewed journals, however, and their efforts seem contained largely within the private
sector. Thus, in contrast to Lee and colleagues, Hubert and Kenning20 see neuromarketing as
a business activity rather than an academic field focused on scholarship. They propose that
the broader field of neuroscientific consumer research (what Lee and colleagues refer to as
neuromarketing) should be labeled “consumer neuroscience,” and they define
neuromarketing more narrowly as “the application of these findings within the scope of
managerial practice.”
A useful comparison can be made to neuroeconomics, an academic discipline that studies
various aspects of economic decision making.21 This field has also attracted attention
recently and often uses imaging technology, but it is more clearly an academic discipline.
Recent commentators echo the above distinction between scholarship and application,
asserting that neuroeconomics should be considered apart from specific investigations for
marketing purposes.2 Neuroeconomics has undergone extensive theoretical development as
a field,21–24 and it has already produced a wealth of evidence on decision making in real-
world contexts. Neuroeconomics researchers often use commonly recognized objects like
consumer products to study general concepts like sensory processing, choice, and the
evaluation of losses and rewards, but these studies are not done for a particular company or
marketing application. For example, McClure and colleagues25 examined subjects'
responses to Coke and Pepsi using fMRI; this model was chosen to understand sensory
perception of common cultural symbols, not to aid the Coca-Cola Company or PepsiCo in
their marketing design. More broadly, much neuroscience and psychology research is
potentially useful for understanding choice and preference, but is not neuroeconomics (or
neuromarketing) per se. The neuroeconomics community now comprises over one dozen
university-based research centers, one scientific society, and a considerable literature that
includes numerous textbooks.
In contrast, the academic foundations of neuromarketing as a field are difficult to identify. It
is unclear at present whether neuromarketing qualifies as an academic field, and if it does,
what distinguishes it from neuroeconomics. We have found only a handful of scholarly
reports of the results of industry-sponsored neuromarketing. In 2002, scientists from the
University of Ulm in Germany, supported by Daimler Chrysler, published a report on the
visual perception of automobiles,26 and scientists at UCLA received partial funding from the
political consultancy FKF Research to analyze the neural reactions of registered Republicans
and Democrats to faces of presidential candidates.27 Anecdotally, a few companies have
also conducted neuromarketing studies but have not published their work in peer-reviewed
journals. For example, researchers at Caltech's Social Cognitive Neuroscience Laboratory
have reportedly partnered with Lieberman Research to help Hollywood studios select movie
trailers.3
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But beyond these few cases, it is not clear how widespread neuromarketing is or even
exactly what it is. Thus, several critical questions remain: Does neuromarketing involve
more than this handful of companies? How are these companies presenting themselves and
neuromarketing itself? To what extent are medical professionals and academicians involved
in their work? What claims are they making? What are the ethical obligations of medical
professionals, including psychiatrists, with regard to this new practice? To examine these
themes, we performed an exploratory study to capture a sense of the range, variety, and
frequency of key characteristics of neuromarketing companies. Since an ever burgeoning
amount of medical information is being offered through the Internet,28–31 we decided to
examine these issues through neuromarketing Web sites.
NEUROMARKETING WEB SITES
To probe the similarities, differences, and patterns that might appear among neuromarketing
companies, we searched Google for “neuromarketing.” We examined the maximum number
of available hits—1,000 in this case—and identified 16 companies offering neuromarketing
services. We included all marketing sites that described any neuro-science methods but
excluded Web logs (blogs), media sites, and other noncommercial hits that did not offer
such services. Then, using the methodology we have described previously to study how the
Web sites of in vitro fertilization clinics present the risks and benefits of preimplantation
genetic diagnosis,32 we developed a coding strategy to qualitatively describe these
neuromarketing sites. In brief, we each independently read the 16 Web sites, developed
categories to code, and worked together to reconcile the three independently developed
coding schemes into a single scheme. With that scheme in place, we reviewed all of the Web
sites and assigned codes together. The results are presented in the text box on the next page.
Early commentators assumed the term neuromarketing indicated the use of brain imaging
such as fMRI,4 but many companies seem not to use imaging but rely, instead, on a variety
of technologies (or on no technology at all). As shown in the text box, of the 16 companies
identified, only 5 offered fMRI; 9 offered EEG services; and 12 offered some other
neuroscience-related technology, including: magnetoencephalography, “psychophysics,”
software services, eye tracking, galvanic skin response, electrocardiography,
electromyography, and analysis of pupil dilation, blush, blinking, heartbeat, or breathing. Of
note, one company did not offer any technology; instead, it offered only focus groups and
other simple marketing strategies, but described these methods using neuroscience terms.
Only four companies listed their clients, and only one listed costs. This relatively limited
transparency is relevant to consumer groups' criticisms of Emory University. Those groups
alleged that companies could be secretly damaging public health by promoting unhealthy
products like junk food or cigarettes, or that they could even threaten individual liberty by
designing more effective political propaganda.8 While this line of attack may seem alarmist
to some, it is comparable to the criticisms levied against academic medical centers during
debates about the divestment of tobacco stock—which were made on the basis of the
mission of academic medical centers to protect the public health.33
In terms of the science itself, 13 companies described their methodology, but these
descriptions were often insufficient to determine what was being done. For example, one
stated that it could “measure almost any form of stimulus material in many different types of
environment” via “[t]echniques” involving “[n]eurological responses via EEG eg [sic] the
nature and intensity of different mind-state shifts, levels of attention and emotions.”* In
*The concern here is not about specific companies but about the broader phenomenon of neuromarketing. Although we have therefore
not included the sources of the quotations from neuromarketing Web sites, we do have the original sources on file.
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most cases, the companies alluded to techniques or simply listed technologies without
describing the actual experimental design. Furthermore, little evidence was provided for
their claims. Eleven Web sites did not reference any peer-reviewed articles, either in support
of their methods or as reports of their previous work. Six included caveats to their
technology, and only one company provided citations for its specific claims.
The examples that we found illustrate the confusion over the precise disciplinary definition
of neuromarketing: whether it is essentially an academic field or a marketing application.
Five of these companies do employ academicians; five sites reference the academic
literature; and one had a university affiliation. The involvement of professionals is
comparatively larger, as nine sites had holders of advanced science degrees on staff (more
PhDs than MDs).
Seven sites displayed some graphic depiction of the brain on their home pages, and nine had
a picture of the brain or of other “data.” Nine also had links to media coverage.
With regard to the claims themselves, the majority (10 of 16) of the neuromarketing
companies promised the “truth” or what customers “really” think; for example: “we measure
what consumers really think and feel, rather than simply what they state,” or we “unlock
what your customer really thinks.” Ten also invoked the workings of the sub- or
unconscious mind in relation to their methods (e.g., “These measurements … will reveal
mental activity operating below the level of conscious awareness.”). Half explicitly claimed
that their methods were an improvement over past technologies, though only one company
claimed that it could predict future behavior. In light of the current state of imaging
technology, these claims appear questionable at best.
As shown in the text box on the next page, we saw a variety of claims suggesting
reductionism, which the Oxford English Dictionary defines as the practice of describing or
explaining a complex phenomenon in terms of relatively simple or fundamental concepts.34
In this case, reductionism was apparent in statements such as “types and levels of emotions”
or “what part of the brain is telling” consumers to make decisions. Other examples were less
striking but still seemed to suggest a simplistic explanation for complex brain processes
(e.g., “quantify and localise brain activity in areas involved in emotion, attention, memory
and decision-making”) We did not develop an additional code for this process of
oversimplification; it was too difficult and uncertain to specify exactly when an
interpretation of neuroscientific findings becomes reductionistic. However, we thought it
important to bring these examples to light, as they seem to capitalize on the public
fascination with neuroscience. Racine and colleagues35 have described a concept they term
neuro-essentialism: the immediate, uninquisitive equation of identity and agency to the brain
and its substructures. Similarly, Vidal36 has proposed the concept of brainhood: the
condition of “being rather than having a brain,” in which humans are “cerebral subjects”
whose selfhood is determined by their brains alone. Indeed, these examples seem to go
beyond simply overvaluing technology to suggest that all human behavior and thought can
be reduced to regional brain activity.
Finally, none of the Web sites mentioned issues of privacy or confidentiality (e.g., who else,
if anyone, might have access to data that are collected) and what, if anything, might be done
with incidental findings (e.g., evidence of pathology).
DISCUSSION
This brief study raises several broader issues relevant to the public understanding of science
and academic professionalism.
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Public Understanding of Science
It is worrisome that neuromarketing companies appear to be providing links to media rather
than to scientific literature, as media coverage could be used in the absence of peer-reviewed
evidence to prematurely legitimize the use of these technologies. The media has an
important role in communicating scientific discoveries, but multidirectional communication
between neuroscientists and the lay public is more desirable than relying on the media alone
to disseminate scientific results; media reports alone may not sufficiently capture essential
limitations of specific studies.37
Many of the Web sites that we found included some graphical representation of brain
function, such as a picture of a brain, cartoon data, or other suggestive graphics. This
marketing approach is probably effective; as mentioned above, when descriptions of
research findings are accompanied by graphical representations, laypersons consider those
results more believable.11 The use of such graphics may be problematic, however, as their
widespread use may obscure certain scientific and technological limitations that have a
general tendency to be ignored when such methods are popularized. Among other things,
since these vivid graphics are produced only through intensive statistical and image
processing, the results can be manipulated to highlight or underplay differences among brain
regions. Further problems derive from the physical nature of the signal on which these
methods rely. All neurotechnologies measure surrogate signals for neural activity (such as
the blood oxygen level-dependent, or BOLD, response of fMRI), and these signals are
constrained by the physical and biological limitations of the technology in question and the
brain itself. This dependence upon surrogate signals, rather than direct measures, is typically
ignored in popular depictions of neuroscience, such as when technologies are described as
direct windows into the working of the brain (e.g., “we can literally `map' the human mind
as it reacts to stimuli”).
It appears that few neuromarketing companies have published their results. These findings
could be scientifically useful, and companies would be performing a valuable public service
if they published them in the academic literature. Such dissemination is unlikely, however,
because of the proprietary nature of such findings and their potential strategic usefulness,
and it is also unlikely that neuromarketing companies (like any other for-profit businesses)
can be compelled to release those results. Such an intervention might be warranted if
neuromarketing were actually able to manipulate consumer behavior and if the targets of
that marketing effort could not detect that they were being manipulated. This scenario,
which is described as stealth neuromarketing in one analysis,6 is not possible using current
technology. If and when it does become possible, however, it would surely represent a
significant threat to consumer autonomy—so much so that it would fundamentally alter our
understanding of autonomy and free will. But for now, neuromarketing companies bear no
special duty to transparency.
Professional and Academic Conduct
Psychiatry has often served as a crucible for testing new ideas about the brain and mind, and
the example of neuromarketing may hold lessons for our field. The current value granted to
neuroimaging could be said to descend directly from the late-nineteenth-century concept of
“instruments of precision.”38 From thermometers and blood pressure cuffs to EEG and
fMRI machines, medical researchers have long striven to quantify previously subjective
observations. Neuromarketing, as one of the earliest manifestations of commercialized
neuroscience in the post-imaging era, may well be a harbinger of developments within
psychiatry—for example, a rush toward diagnostic certainty through imaging. Indeed, one
for-profit venture is already marketing the use of brain imaging for psychiatric diagnosis.39
Psychiatry as a field should closely consider the limitations of such measures. At a time
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when the development of the new Diagnostic and Statistical Manual is attracting vigorous
public commentary, and when the validity of psychiatric diagnosis is publicly debated, the
claim that imaging technology is a unique route to diagnostic certainty could be a premature
way to seek to legitimize complex disease concepts; if these new methods or the concepts
they support are not consistently found to be valid and reliable, “neuronosology” could
undercut public trust in psychiatric research.
Several topics in medical professionalism suggest further concerns. There exists a sizeable
literature on conflicts of interest in medicine, and in view of the potential for such conflicts
to encourage reporting bias40 and data withholding,41 detailed proposals for academic
medical centers have been advanced. Regarding communications and the public
understanding of science, however—unlike research per se—there is little specific guidance
about professional involvement with entrepreneurial ventures such as neuromarketing. The
Charter on Medical Professionalism identifies one aspect of professionalism as “providing
expert advice to society on matters of health,”42 and previous writers have highlighted the
need for physicians to counteract declining trust in the medical profession by doing work
that “contributes to the public value for which the profession stands.”43 Society expects the
medical profession to be beneficent: honest, accountable, transparent, and a source of
objective advice and information.44 Some have urged physicians to be more engaged in the
public arena, but these discussions often refer primarily to advocacy and activism, not public
communications about science.45
Since neuromarketing has socially and ethically relevant implications—for example,
regarding self, agency, and free will—it is important to consider closely the participation of
medical professionals in neuromarketing companies.46 Considering that the field of
neuromarketing is still emerging, it is premature to recommend prohibiting professionals
from becoming involved at all. That said, academic medical centers might well consider
formulating policies to address concerns about neuromarketing. Survey data have revealed
that institutional policies around conflicts of interest vary significantly47 and that most such
policies lack specificity.48 Academic medical centers could take the lead in promoting
transparency regarding neuromarketing and similar enterprises by requiring their faculty to
publish consulting agreements, advisory positions, and other entrepreneurial relationships on
a publically available source such as the institution's Web site. This suggestion mirrors
existing policy proposals regarding ties to pharmaceutical companies—policies that, in an
attempt to safeguard against bias in reporting research results, require the posting of
information about such ties.49
More broadly, all academicians have a duty to the public trust: they need to communicate
clearly about science and cannot rely on the popular press to fulfill that responsibility with
the same clarity and accuracy.50 Gibbons51 has proposed that the production of scientific
knowledge should be seen by society to be “both transparent and participative.” It is
troubling that in our example of neuromarketing, companies with academicians on staff have
made questionable claims without evidence-based citations. Indeed, promising to deliver a
deterministic way of understanding and ultimately manipulating consumer behavior is
premature, and over time such unrealistic claims could be seen as a violation of an implicit
social contract—and as harming public respect for science and jeopardizing public support
of research in general.52
Individual neuromarketing companies and the academicians employed by them should
recognize the potential benefit to be gained by instituting better practices on their own—for
instance, to avoid unfounded claims and to adhere more closely to accepted standards of
scientific evidence. In response to the perceived excesses of neuromarketing, some
observers have suggested that legislation may be needed to regulate the commercial use of
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imaging technology.5 Self-regulation by industry and by individual academicians might help
to forestall such restrictions while simultaneously improving transparency and research
quality. Similarly, while these companies are not under the purview of health privacy laws,
as they are not health care providers, they should have measures in place both to protect the
confidentiality of the data that they record and to enable the portability of images, records,
and other information that might prove to be useful for their subjects. Considering that
neuromarketing studies might disclose important radiologic findings, companies should
have an explicit protocol in place for reporting and referral, as recommended by Murphy and
colleagues.6
CONCLUSIONS
The issues raised by neuromarketing highlight important professional, ethical, and scientific
concerns. This new field exemplifies the complicated issue of professional ethics as applied
to academic-industrial relationships. Furthermore, as a new application of neuroscience
methods, neuromarketing raises important considerations for the responsible conduct of
research and the public understanding of neuroscience.
More research is needed in order to better understand neuromarketing, neuromarketing
companies, and their practices and claims. Our exploration of these companies used only
publicly presented information. Further investigations could directly assess the actual roles
of professionals and academics in these companies. For example: whether they are in a
position to oversee the collection, interpretation, or dissemination of research findings; how
the roles of academicians are defined; and whether they are paid. Several questions remain:
Who is using neuromarketing, and for what specifically? What advice and data do they
receive as part of these services? And do they perceive any return on investment?
It would be interesting to investigate the quality of neuromarketing research directly since
the private sponsorship of biomedical research has been found to be associated with pro-
industry conclusions.39 As neuromarketing grows in scale and enters more fully into society,
as well as into various media and economic marketplaces, the concerns expressed here about
the industry's claims and about the roles of professionals in promoting scientific legitimacy
will become increasingly important.
Psychiatrists in academics and clinical practice alike should be alert to the implications of
new neurotechnologies, including neuromarketing, as these applications carry important
consequences for both the public trust in academic medicine and the public's evolving
comprehension of mind/brain interrelationships.
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Characteristics of Neuromarketing Web Sites (n = 16)
Services offered
 fMRI 31.2% (5)
 EEG 56.3% (9)
 Other technologies 75% (12)
Business considerations
 Costs listed 6.2% (1)
 Clients listed 25% (4)
Descriptions of science
 Methodology described 81.2% (13)
 Peer reviewed publications on Web site 31.2% (5)
 Peer reviewed publications by lab or affiliates on Web site 25% (4)
Professionals on staff
 Academicians on staff 31.2% (5)
 MDs listed on staff 31.2% (5)
 PhDs listed on staff 56.3% (9)
 Listing of university affiliation 6.2% (1)
 Any holder of advanced science degree 56.3% (9)
Web site format
 Picture of brain on home page 43.8% (7)
 Picture of brain function (e.g., fMRI, EEG) on home page 31.2% (5)
 Cartoon graph on home page 12.5% (2)
 Any other graph/visual data on home page 18.8% (3)
 At least one of above graphics 56.3% (9)
 Links of media coverage 56.3% (9)
Specific claims
 Use of terms truth / real / really 62.5% (10)
 Revealing secrets/subconscious 62.5% (10)
 Predicting future behavior 6.2% (1)
Claims of neuromarketing as improvement over other techs
  Mitigating factors 50% (8)
 Provide citations for claims 6.2% (1)
 Caveats to technology 37.5% (6)
Ethics
 Specific ethics section on Web site 12.5% (2)
 Mention of word “ethics” 12.5% (2)
 Advertise for subjects 12.5% (2)
 Risk/benefits description for subjects 0†
†
One includes a link to a Web site in German.
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Examples of Reductive Claims
Web site Quotation
1 “we use the fMRI … to learn why consumers make the decisions they do, and that part of the brain is telling them to do it”
2 “instantaneously monitors and records how consumers' brains process what they see, hear, and read from one moment to the next”
3 “the member is exposed to a series of visual and sonic stimuli aimed to stimulate … a brainwave response to a definite recognitionof the stimulus shown”
4
“Neuromarketing is now able to identify the type and levels of emotions experienced when consumers are exposed to all types of
commercial messages. It is possible to discover how that information is being processed … by their brains, the type and degree of
interest shown and the extent to which new information is being established in long term memory.”
5 “The brainwave responses to these stimuli are measured using a patented headband equipped with EEG sensors. The data is thenanalyzed to determine if the relevant information is present in the subject's memory.”
6 “fMRI … allows researchers to view the human mind in real-time, as emotions and cognitive thoughts are at play. Using fMRI, wecan literally “map” the human mind as it reacts to stimuli with which it is presented.”
7 “EEG capability that measures brainwave cognition and emotion on a moment-by-moment basis.”
8
“When a part of the brain becomes active, the brightness of the images changes. By analysing the images using sophisticated
computer programmes, we can quantify and localise brain activity in areas involved in emotion, attention, memory and decision-
making.”
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